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Abstract
We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of
distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling a⁄ects
competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist
and hence the outcome is often ine¢ cient. When bundling is allowed, each seller
has an incentive to bundle his products and an e¢ cient equilibrium always exists.
Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are e¢ cient if slotting con-
tracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio e⁄ects of bundling and analyze the
consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
Key words: Bundling, Portfolios, Slots (or Shelf Space), Pure Bundling, Slotting
Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, Foreclosure
JEL Code: D4, K21, L13, L41, L82
￿We thank the participants of seminars at Georgia Institute of Technology, IESE Business School, Korea
University, UniversitØ de Cergy-Pontoise, University of Oxford, UniversitØ Paris X and of presentations at
EARIE08, Net Institute Conference 08, PET08, SED 08, Workshop on Market Power in Vertically Related
Markets (Toulouse) 09, CSIO-IDEI IO Workshop 09. We also thank the comments from Jung-Hyun Ahn,
Eric Avenel, Jay Pil Choi, Jacques CrØmer, Denis Gromb, Bruno Jullien, Byung-Cheol Kim, Volker Nocke,
Patrick Rey, RØgis Renault and in particular Michael Whinston. Jeon gratefully acknowledges the ￿nancial
support from the Spanish government under SEJ2006-09993/ECON.
yToulouse School of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR. dohshin.jeon@gmail.com
zUniversit￿ degli Studi di Firenze, Italy. domenico.menicucci@dmd.uni￿.it1 Introduction
There are many situations in which sellers with di⁄erent portfolios of products compete
for limited slots (or shelf space) of a buyer who wants to build up her own portfolio of
distinct products. In this situation, sellers may employ bundling as a strategy to win the
competition for slots. Even though bundling has been a major antitrust issue and a subject
of intensive research, to the best of our knowledge, the literature seems to have paid little
attention to competition among portfolios of distinct products and, in particular, no paper
seems to have studied how bundling a⁄ects portfolios￿competition for slots. In this paper,
we attempt to provide a new perspective on bundling by addressing this issue.
Examples of situations we described above are abundant both among digital products
and among physical products. For instance, in the movie industry, each movie distributor
has a portfolio of distinct movies and buyers (either movie theaters or TV stations) have
limited slots. More precisely, the number of movies that can be projected in a season (or in
a year) by a theater is constrained by time and the number of projection rooms. Likewise,
the number of movies that a TV station can show during prime time of a season (or year)
is limited. Actually, allocation of slots in movie theaters has been one of the main issues
raised in the movie industry during the last presidential election in France.1 Furthermore,
bundling in the movie industry (known as block booking2) was declared illegal in two
Supreme Court decisions in U.S.: Paramount Pictures (1948), where blocks of ￿lms were
rented for theatrical exhibition, and Loew￿ s (1962), where blocks of ￿lms were rented for
television exhibition. In addition, recently in MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp.
(11th Circuit, April 1999), the court of appeals rea¢ rmed the per se illegal status of block
booking.
A di⁄erent situation we have in mind is that of manufacturers￿competition for retailers￿
shelf space. Manufacturers having a portfolio of products may practice bundling (often
called full-line forcing) to win competition for slots,3 and there have been antitrust cases
1Cahiers du Cinema (April, 2007) proposes to limit the number copies per movie since certain movies
by saturating screens restrict other movies￿access to screens and asks each presidential candidate￿ s opinion
about the policy proposal.
2Block booking refers to ￿ the practice of licensing, or o⁄ering for license, one feature or group of
features on the condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released
by distributors during a given period￿ (Unites States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156
(1948)).
3For instance, Procter and Gamble uses ￿ golden-store￿arrangement such that to be considerd a golden
store, a retailer must agree to carry 40 or so P&G items displayed together. See ￿ P&G has big plans for
the shelves of tiny stores in emgering nations￿ , Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2007.
1related to this practice.4 For instance, the French Competition Authority ￿ned SociØtØ
des Caves de Roquefort for using selectivity or exclusivity contracts with supermarket
chains.5 Furthermore, slotting arrangements, the payment by manufacturers for retail shelf
space, have become increasingly important and have been the subject of recent antitrust
litigations6 and the focus of Federal Trade Commission studies.7
In our model, we assume away buyer￿ s private information, which allows us to depart
from the existing literature on bundling that usually considers a framework of second-
degree price discrimination and to identify what seems to us a ￿rst-order e⁄ect of bundling.
Actually, in the case of movie industry, Kenney and Klein (1983) point out that second-order
price discrimination explanation of bundling is inconsistent with the facts of Paramount
and Loew￿ s since the prices of the blocks varied a great deal across markets. Furthermore,
in the Digital era, the prices are more and more tailored to buyers￿characteristics as in the
case of pricing of academic journals (Edlin and Rubinfeld 2004, Jeon and Menicucci 2006).
We consider a simultaneous pricing game among n sellers (or ￿rms) who sell their
products to a buyer having k(> 0) number of slots. Each seller i has a portfolio of ni
distinct products. We assume that the prototype of each product is already made and call
a product a digital good (a physical good) if the cost of producing a copy is zero (strictly
positive). The buyer has a unit demand for each product. In our setting, a product needs
to occupy a slot to generate a value. Products have heterogenous values and the values
are independent.8 Social e¢ ciency requires the slots to be allocated to the best k products
among all products. In this setup, we study how the outcome of competition depends on the
nature of products (digital goods versus physical goods) and di⁄erent bilateral contractual
arrangements between each seller and the buyer.
Given a portfolio of products belonging to a ￿rm, we de￿ne bundling as a menu contract
4SociØtØ des Caves de Roquefort, Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision 04-D-13, 8th April 2004. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 363 (M.D.N.C. 2002). In the second case,
Reynolds Tobacco accused Philip Morris for using "Retail Leaders" contract that provides discounts to
retailers on its popular Marlboro brand in exchange for the most advantageous display and signage space
in retail establishments.
5SociØtØ des Caves de Roquefort￿ s market share in the Roquefort cheese market was 70% but, through
the contract, could occupy eight among all nine brands that Carrefour, a supermarket chain, sold.
6See, for instances, American Booksellers Ass￿ n, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1031
(N.D. Cal. 2001); Intimate Bookshop, Inc. v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 133 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.C.C. 2000), rev￿ d, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
7See FTC Report (2001) and FTC Study (2003).
8In other words, the value that a product generates does not depend on the set of the other products
that occupy the slots. This assumption is for simplicity and our results hold at least for simple substitutions
among products (see the end of section 6).
2that speci￿es a price for every subset of the portfolio. A particular class of bundling
contracts is what we call ￿independent pricing plus a ￿xed fee￿ . A strategy in this class
consists of a ￿xed fee for the right to buy products in the portfolio and one individual price
for each product. There are three interesting special cases of this class. Individual pricing
corresponds to the case with zero ￿xed fee; pure bundling corresponds to the case with
zero individual prices; a ￿technology-renting￿strategy is the case in which each individual
price is equal to the cost of production.
Interestingly, the change from independent pricing to bundling opens a new contractual
dimension, i.e. contracting on slots. Note that under independent pricing, the buyer will
purchase only those products that would occupy a slot and therefore slotting contracts
are redundant. In contrast, under bundling, for instance, if all ￿rms o⁄er pure bundles,
the buyer may end up buying more products than the slots and hence we need to distin-
guish bundling with slotting contracts from bundling without slotting contracts. A slotting
contract is de￿ned such that if a bundle is sold with a slotting contract, the buyer must
allocate a slot to each product in the bundle: exclusive dealing corresponds to a special case
in which the number of products in the bundle sold with a slotting contract is equal to k.
Therefore, the contractual space increases as we move from individual pricing to bundling
without slotting contracts and from bundling without slotting contracts to bundling with
the permission of slotting contracts.
Our main results are the following. First, under independent pricing, equilibrium often
does not exist and hence the outcome is often ine¢ cient.9 Second, each ￿rm has an incentive
to use bundling instead of independent pricing since bundling reduces competition from
rival products. Third, when bundling is allowed, there always exists an e¢ cient equilibrium
where each ￿rm uses a technology-renting strategy, regardless of whether or not ￿rms can
use slotting contracts. Our technology-renting equilibrium generalizes the marginal cost
pricing result10 in the literature on competition in non-linear pricing (Armstrong-Vickers,
2001, 2008 and Rochet-Stole 2002) to a situation in which any number of ￿rm can sell any
number of products. Furthermore, if all products are digital goods, all equilibria are e¢ cient
as long as slotting contracts are prohibited. However, if sellers use slotting contracts,
ine¢ cient equilibria can arise even in the case of digital goods. For physical goods, we ￿nd
9Because of the equilibrium non-existence under simultaneous pricing, we consider sequential pricing
in a paper (Jeon-Menicucci, 2009) ancillary to this paper: then the equilibrium exists under independent
pricing. We characterize it and ￿nd that each seller faces a trade-o⁄ between quantity (i.e. number of slots
to occupy) and extracting surplus per product and that there is no particular reason that this trade-o⁄
leads to e¢ cient allocation of slots.
10Charging the variable price(s) equal to the (constant) marginal cost(s) is equivalent to renting the
production technology.
3a restriction on the sellers￿pricing strategies that makes all equilibria e¢ cient. Fourth, we
identify portfolio e⁄ects of bundling and analyze the implications on horizontal merger. By
portfolio e⁄ects of bundling, we mean that even though two ￿rms end up selling products of
identical values to the buyer, they can realize di⁄erent pro￿ts if their portfolios are di⁄erent
in terms of the products that are not sold. We show that because of the portfolio e⁄ects,
￿rms have an incentive to merge. Furthermore, when we make the merger endogenous
by considering the auction of a given product, we ￿nd that the ￿rm with the strongest
portfolio wins the auction, suggesting a tendency of increasing concentration.
One interesting theoretical result is that there is an intermediate level of contractual
space such that decreasing or increasing contractual space beyond this level can hurt ef-
￿ciency. For instance, in the case of digital good, all equilibria are e¢ cient if bundling is
allowed and slotting contracts are forbidden. On the one hand, if bundling is forbidden,
equilibria may not exist. On the other hand, if bundling and slotting contracts are allowed,
ine¢ cient equilibria arise.
To illustrate the incentive to practice bundling, consider a simple example in which ￿rm
1 produces two products of value 3 at zero cost, ￿rm 2 produces one product of value 2
and another product of value zero at zero cost and the buyer has two slots. Suppose that
￿rm 1 wants to sell both products. Then, under independent pricing, each product of ￿rm
1 faces competition from the best product of ￿rm 2 and hence ￿rm 1 realizes a total pro￿t
of 2. Consider now bundling. Throughout the paper, in order to determine the price of
a given bundle, we ￿rst consider the best alternative portfolio that the buyer can build up
without buying the bundle and ask how much extra value the buyer can get by improving
the portfolio with the purchase of the bundle. Then, without buying the bundle, the best
alternative portfolio is composed of only ￿rm 2￿ s products. Instead, if the buyer buys the
bundle, she can replace ￿rm 2￿ s products with ￿rm 1￿ s products. This implies that ￿rm
1 can realize a total pro￿t of 4. This example shows that bundling reduces competition
from rival products by changing competition between individual products into competition
between portfolios. More precisely, under independent pricing, each product of ￿rm 1 faces
competition from the best product of ￿rm 2 but, under bundling, only one product of ￿rm
1 faces competition from the best product of ￿rm 2 and the other product of ￿rm 1 faces
competition from the second best product of 2.
To give the intuition about e¢ ciency under bundling, consider digital goods and assume
that slotting contracts are forbidden. Consider a ￿rm owning m 2 [1;k] number of products
belonging to the k best among all products in the industry. Then the best alternative
portfolio that the buyer can build without access to the ￿rm￿ s portfolio includes m products
that are inferior to the m products of the ￿rm. Since the buyer can increase her payo⁄ by
4replacing each inferior product with a superior product of the ￿rm, the ￿rm can generate
a strictly positive pro￿t from each replacement by selling the bundle of the m products.
Therefore, all equilibria are e¢ cient. However, if ￿rms use slotting contracts, ine¢ cient
equilibria can arise since if the buyer is bound by slotting contracts, the buyer may not be
able to replace an inferior product with a superior one.
Our paper generates clear-cut policy implications (see section 9). In particular, in the
case of digital goods, our results suggest that bundling or block booking is good for ef-
￿cient allocation of slots while slotting contracts (and hence exclusive dealing) are not
socially desirable. Furthermore, we also derive policy implications with respect to foreclo-
sure: bundling is unlikely to be a useful instrument for foreclosure (since bundling reduces
competition), while slotting contracts can provide a direct instrument of foreclosure.
According to the leverage theory, on which the Supreme Court￿ s decisions to prohibit
block booking were based, block booking allows a distributor to extend its monopoly power
in a desirable movie to an undesirable one. This theory was criticized by the Chicago School
(see e.g. Bowman 1957, Posner 1976, Bork 1978) since the distributor is better o⁄by selling
only the desirable movie at a higher price. As an alternative, Stigler (1968) proposed a
theory based on price discrimination,11 which became a dominant strand (Schmalensee,
1984, McAfee et al. 1989, Sha⁄er, 1991, Salinger 1995 and Armstrong 1996) at least until
Whinston (1990) resuscitated the leverage theory with its ￿rst formal treatment (see, for
the later work in this line, Choi-Stefanadis 2001, Carlton-Waldman 2002, and Nalebu⁄
2004).12 Basically, in Whinston, tying allows an incumbent to commit to be aggressive,
which discourages entry if there is a ￿xed cost of entry. On the contrary, in our paper,
bundling softens competition from rival products and hence it is possible that every ￿rm
realizes a (weakly) higher pro￿t when bundling is allowed than when it is prohibited. Then,
bundling is unlikely to be an instrument of foreclosure. In section 2, we review Chicago
school criticism of the leverage theory and Whinston￿ s revival of the theory and explain
how we strengthen Chicago school￿ s arguments.
11However, Kenney and Klein (1983) point out that simple price discrimination explanation is incon-
sistent with the facts of Paramount and Loew￿ s and argue that block booking mainly prevents exhibitors
from oversearching, (i.e. from rejecting ￿lms revealed ex post to be of below-average value). Their hypoth-
esis is empirically tested in a recent paper by Hanssen (2000) but the author ￿nds little support for the
hypothesis. But Kenny and Klein (2000) do not agree with Hanseen￿ s analysis.
12Armstrong-Vickers (2008) is a bit related to our paper since they consider bundling in a symmetric
situation: they study competition between two symmetric ￿rms producing two horizontally di⁄erentiated
products (i.e. consumers are located in a two-dimensional hotelling space). They ￿nd that compared to
linear pricing, non-linear pricing has the bene￿t of e¢ cient variable prices (i.e. marginal cost pricing) but
the cost of excessive brand loyalty.
5Since each ￿rm can bundle any number of products in our paper, we also contribute to
the recent literature on bundling a large number of products. More precisely, in a framework
of second-degree price discrimination, Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)
show that bundling allows a monopolist to extract more surplus since it reduces the variance
of average valuations by the law of large numbers. In our paper, since we assume complete
information, the rent extraction issue does not arise in a monopoly setting and the law
of large number plays no role. In Jeon-Menicucci (2006), we take a framework similar to
the one in the current paper to study bundling electronic academic journals; publishers
owning portfolios of distinct journals compete to sell them to a library. The key di⁄erence
is that competition is generated by the budget constraint of the library instead of the
slot constraint. In both papers, we ￿nd that bundling is a pro￿table strategy in terms of
surplus extraction. However, contrary to the current paper, Jeon-Menicucci (2006) ￿nd
that bundling reduces social welfare since if large publishers extract more surplus with
bundling, there is less (even zero) budget left for small publishers.
Our e¢ ciency result of bundling is very closely related to the ￿nding in literature on
common agency (Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986, 1998), O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1997,
2005)) that shows that when multiple principals deal with a common agent, they can achieve
the outcome that maximizes the payo⁄s of all players. In particular, Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1998) and O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1997) study the situation when two single-product
￿rms simultaneously o⁄er non-linear tari⁄s together with exclusive dealing contract to a
common retailer and ￿nd that the vertically-integrated outcome is obtained.13 However,
the papers also ￿nd other ine¢ cient equilibria and use either the coalition-proof Nash equi-
libria (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) or Pareto dominance (Bernheim and Whinston 1998
and O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er 1997) to select the equilibrium maximizing joint pro￿ts. Our
contribution is to identify a contracting space (or a condition on contracts) that makes all
equilibria e¢ cient in terms of allocation of slots by distinguishing digital goods from physi-
cal goods, which allows us to make clear-cut policy implications on bundling and exclusive
dealing. Our paper also di⁄ers in its focus on comparison between independent pricing and
bundling with emphasis on the di⁄erence between digital goods and physical goods in a
novel setting of competition among portfolios in the presence of slot constraint.
In what follows, section 2 reviews the Chicago School Criticism and the revival of the
leverage theory with a simple model and explains our contribution. Section 3 illustrates the
key results with a simple example. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 gives a su¢ cient
condition for equilibrium non-existence under independent pricing. Section 6 presents the
13O￿ Brien-Sha⁄er (2005) show that this result also holds under simultaneous Nash bargaining for the
case of N single-product ￿rms.
6main results when ￿rms cannot use slotting contracts. Section 7 studies the situation when
￿rms can use slotting contracts. Section 8 identi￿es portfolio e⁄ects of bundling and studies
the implications on horizontal mergers. Section 9 derives policy implications on bundling
and slotting contracts in terms of static e¢ ciency and foreclosure and concludes the paper.
2 Leverage Theory: Criticism and Revival
According to the leverage theory of tying (or bundling), a multiproduct ￿rm with monopoly
power in one market can monopolize a second market using the leverage provided by its
monopoly power in the ￿rst market. The theory was largely discredited as a result of
criticisms originating in the Chicago School (see e.g. Bowman 1957, Posner 1976, Bork
1978) and then was revived by Whinston (1990). In this section, we review both the
Chicago School Criticism and Whinston￿ s revival of the leverage theory in a highly stylized
model and explain our contribution with respect to them.
2.1 Chicago School Criticism
Consider two independent products (1, 2) and two sellers (A, B). A is the monopolist of
product 1 and A and B compete in the market for product 2. There is a single customer,
called C, who has a unit demand for each product. Assume that the cost of production is
c(> 0) for each product. C￿ s valuation (willingness to pay) for product 1 is u1
A(> c) and C￿ s
valuation for product 2 produced by A (B) is u2
A > c (u2
B > c). We assume the following
incompatibility condition; c > u2
B ￿ u2
A. The assumption means that once C buys product
2 from A, B cannot induce C to buy his own product without making a loss. In addition,
we suppose that u1
A + u2
A > u2
B + c, which implies that by bundling his own two products,
A can induce C to buy the bundle and realize a positive pro￿t. We consider a two stage
game in which A ￿rst decides whether or not to bundle his products, and then A and B
compete in prices. In the case of bundling, A o⁄ers only the pure bundle: in the example
of section 2, bundling means pure bundling.
In the absence of bundling, seller i(=A,B) simultaneously chooses a price for product
j(= 1;2), p
j
i 2 [c;1). In equilibrium, A always sells product 1 at p1
A = u1




B if and only if u2
A ￿ u2
B.14 Hence, the pro￿t of A without bundling is
given by u1
A ￿ c + maxf0;u2
A ￿ u2
Bg and the outcome is always socially e¢ cient.
Suppose now that A bundles his own products and charges PA for the bundle. Then, in
equilibrium he succeeds in selling the bundle at PA = u1
A + c + u2
A ￿ u2
B, realizing a pro￿t
14If instead u2
A < u2
B, then B sells his own product 2 at p2




A ￿ c + u2
A ￿ u2
B: This implies that the outcome is socially ine¢ cient if u2
A < u2
B.
Comparing A￿ s pro￿t in the two cases of bundling and no bundling, we see that bundling
does not a⁄ect the pro￿t if u2
A ￿ u2
B, but decreases it otherwise. This shows that A never
has the incentive to practice bundling for the purpose of monopolizing the tied product
market. Furthermore, a laissez-faire policy always achieves social e¢ ciency.
However, we notice that the Chicago School￿ s criticism is a weak argument in a double
sense: a social planner never strictly prefers bundling (since the outcome is always socially
e¢ cient without bundling but it can be ine¢ cient with bundling) and sellers never have
any strict incentive to practice bundling (since a seller can never strictly increase his pro￿t
with bundling).
In our paper, we ￿nd a strong argument for laissez-faire regarding bundling: in par-
ticular, in the case of digital goods (i) if bundling is prohibited, market outcome is often
ine¢ cient since equilibrium often does not exist but if bundling is allowed, an e¢ cient equi-
librium always exists and all equilibria are e¢ cient (without slotting contracts) (ii) each
seller has at least a weak and sometimes a strict incentive to practice bundling. In section
3, we illustrate these points with a simple example.
2.2 Revival of the Leverage Theory
The leverage theory has been revived by Whinston (1990), who points out that the Chicago
school argument hinges crucially on the assumption that the tied good market has a com-
petitive constant returns-to-scale structure. He shows that if scale economies exist and
the structure of the tied market is oligopolistic, tying can be an e⁄ective strategy for a
monopolist to extend monopoly power to the tied good market by inducing exit of the rival
￿rm(s).
To present his contribution, we modify the timing as follows: B makes an entry decision
after A￿ s bundling/no bundling decision. If B decides to enter the market 2, it must pay a
￿xed cost of F satisfying F < u2
B￿u2
A. The inequality means that if there was no bundling,
B could successfully enter the market 2. However, u2
B ￿u2
A < u1
A ￿c holds from section 2.1
and hence if there was bundling, A would be able to make a positive pro￿t by selling the
bundle even if B enters the market. Therefore, pure bundling allows A to foreclose B from
the market 2.
It is important to notice that in Whinston￿ s model, pure bundling induces A to be
aggressive. More precisely, after bundling, A can realize a positive pro￿t only if he induces
C to buy the bundle and hence A is ready to undercut B￿ s price up to the point that the
price of the bundle reaches 2c. However, bundling is not pro￿table for A once B entered
8the market 2, as u2
B > u2
A. Therefore, A must be able to pre-commit to bundling.
On the contrary, we ￿nd that in our static model without ￿xed cost of entry, bundling
is pro￿table (and hence credible) since it allows to soften competition from rival products.
Furthermore, we show that each ￿rm￿ s pro￿t is likely to be (weakly) higher when bundling
is allowed than when it is prohibited and therefore bundling is unlikely to be an instrument
of foreclosure. In section 3, we illustrate these points with a simple example.
3 Illustration with a simple example
We here give a simple example to illustrate some of our main results. There are two sellers,
A and B, and A has two products with values (u1
A;u2
A) = (4;3), while B has one product of
value u1
B = 2: u
j
i means the value that the customer, C, obtains from the j-th best product
among ￿rm i￿ s products. The values of the products are independent but each product
needs to occupy a slot to generate a value and C has only two slots, which generates
competition among the three products. We consider digital goods: the production cost is
zero for all products. We note that social e¢ ciency requires that the two slots be occupied
by A￿ s two products.
3.1 Without bundling: non-existence of equilibrium
Consider a simultaneous pricing game without bundling: seller i(=A,B) simultaneously
chooses a price for product j(= 1;2), p
j
i 2 R. We show below that this game has no
pure-strategy equilibrium. We assume as a tie-breaking rule that if C is indi⁄erent among
several products, C buys the products with the highest (gross) values.15
First we prove that there is no equilibrium in which A sells only his best product.
Indeed, if A wants to sell only that product, then he can make a pro￿t of 4 by setting
p2
A > 3 and p1
A = 4,16 so that C will not consider buying A￿ s second product but will buy
A￿ s ￿rst product. B￿ s best response to these prices of 1 is p1
B = 2, and A￿ s pro￿t in this
candidate equilibrium is 4. However, a pro￿table deviation exists for A: by setting p1
A = 3:9
and p2
A = 2:9, A succeeds in selling his two products and makes a pro￿t of 6:8 > 4.
Now we prove that there is no equilibrium in which A sells his two products. In order
to sell both products, it is necessary that A sets p1
A ￿ 2 and p2
A ￿ 1, otherwise 4 ￿ p1
A < 2
and/or 3￿p2
A < 2, and then B can pro￿tably sell his own product by charging p1
B > 0 such
15This tie-breaking rule is standard. See footnote 24 for more details.
16Actually, A can make a pro￿t of 4, by selling a unique product, also by playing p2
A = 3 and p1
A = 4,
but in this case we cannot have an equilibrium since there is no best reply for B.
9that 2 ￿ p1
B > minf4 ￿ p1
A;3 ￿ p2
Ag. This implies that the pro￿t of A when he sells both
products is not larger than 3. This is inconsistent with an equilibrium, since we have seen
above that A can make a pro￿t of 4 by selling only his best product.
In summary, equilibrium does not exist for the following reasons. On the one hand, if
A occupies only one slot then he can extract the full surplus of C from his best product.
But then, B￿ s best response is to do the same with his own product, which triggers A￿ s
deviation to occupy both slots. On the other hand, if A occupies both slots, each of A￿ s
products faces competition from B￿ s product such that A￿ s total pro￿t is lower than the
pro￿t he makes from selling only his best product.
3.2 Bundling
Suppose now that A o⁄ers only a bundle including both of his products at a price PA 2 R.
For notational consistency, let PB 2 R denote the price that B charges for his product.
In this pricing game, the unique equilibrium is PA = 5, PB = 0 and C buys A￿ s bundle;
thus the outcome is socially e¢ cient. It is easy to see why this is an equilibrium. A has
no incentive to charge a higher price, as then C prefers buying B￿ s product instead of A￿ s
bundle. Given that B￿ s pro￿t is zero for any PB ￿ 0, PB = 0 is a best response.
Although this example is simple, it generates useful insights. First, it shows that a ￿rm
may have an incentive to use bundling since bundling reduces competition from rival ￿rms￿
products. To explain this, recall from subsection 3.1 that if A wants to occupy both slots
under independent pricing, each of A￿ s products faces competition from B￿ s product and
A￿ s pro￿t is at most 3. However, under bundling, A obtains a pro￿t of 5, which is the
di⁄erence between the gross value of A￿ s bundle (7) and the maximum value C can obtain
without A￿ s bundle (2). Under bundling, it is as if only one product of A faces competition
from B￿ s product and the other product of A does not face any competition. The reason
why a ￿rm can have a strict incentive to use bundling in our model while it has only a
weak incentive in the setup of Chicago school criticism in section 2.1 is that in our model,
all three products compete because of the slot constraint while in the setup of section 2.1,
A￿ s product 1 does not face any competition from product 2.
The intuition for why bundling restores e¢ ciency is that when bundling is allowed and
sellers sell digital goods, every seller having any number of superior products can make a
positive pro￿t by inducing C to replace each inferior product with a superior one. In order
to understand the role of digital goods (c = 0), note that the incompatibility condition
(i.e. c > u2
B ￿u2
A) is necessary for the leverage through pure bundle ￿ la Whinston to work
in section 2. However, for products of heterogenous values (i.e. u2
B > u2
A in our context),
10this condition is violated as c goes to zero. Then, pure bundle cannot be an instrument
of foreclosure. In fact, in the case of digital goods, each ￿rm can ￿nd a best response
in pure bundling strategies (Lemma 1) (and hence pure bundling is credible) and under
competition in pure bundles, the outcome is always e¢ cient (Proposition 3) and each ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t is at least weakly and sometimes strictly larger than his pro￿t under independent
pricing (Proposition 7), which suggests that pure bundling is unlikely to be an instrument
of foreclosure. Therefore, our results imply that block booking of digital goods such as
movies is socially desirable.
4 The Model
4.1 The setting
There are n ￿rms (or sellers), denoted by i = 1;:::;n, and a buyer; we use ￿ he￿for each ￿rm
and ￿ she￿for the buyer; we also use i = 0 to represent the buyer. Each ￿rm i (> 0) has a
portfolio of ni distinct products. We use ij to denote ￿rm i￿ s j-th best product (for instance,
12 represents ￿rm 1￿ s 2nd best product) and Bi = fi1;:::;inig represents i￿ s portfolio of
products; let B ￿ B1 [ ::: [ Bn. The buyer has a unit demand for each product and has k
(￿ 1) number of slots. A product needs to occupy a slot to generate a value,17 and thus the
slot￿ s limited availability generates competition among the products. Let u
j
i be the value
that the buyer obtains from allocating a slot to product ij; thus u1
i ￿ u2
i ￿ ::: ￿ u
ni
i > 0 for
i = 1;:::;n. We assume that the values are independent: we show at the end of Section 6
that our results hold for substitutes as well. Without loss of generality we assume that each
￿rm￿ s portfolio consists of k products: in the case in which ni ￿ k, it is straightforward
that only the k best products of ￿rm i matter in our setting; in the case of ni < k, we
de￿ne u
ni+1
i = ::: = uk
i = 0.18
With regard to production costs, we assume that a prototype of each product is already
produced and the cost of (re)production is c ￿ 0 for every product ij 2 B;19 if c = 0
(c > 0), the products are called digital goods (physical goods). Assume for simplicity that
17By assuming unit demand, we assume for simplicity that a product can occupy at most one slot in
that the value generated from occupying a second slot is zero. This assumption can be relaxed without
changing the main results.
18Even though we consider one buyer, our model can be applied in a straightforward way to a situation
with multiple buyers if each buyer operates in a separate market and each seller can price-discriminate the
buyers.
19The assumption of homogeneous cost is made without loss of generality: at the end of Section 6 we
show that the results are (qualitatively) una⁄ected if this assumption is relaxed.
11no cost is incurred by the buyer.20 The buyer￿ s payo⁄ is given by the sum of the values of
the purchased products minus the prices paid.
Let uj denote the value that the buyer obtains from the j-th best product among all
products in B; thus u1 ￿ u2 ￿ ::: ￿ unk. We assume uk > uk+1 > c, which implies that
the set of the k best products, denoted with BFB, is unique and it is socially optimal to
occupy all slots with the products in BFB. The inequality uk+1 > c is assumed because
when uk+1 ￿ c, there is no competition among products for slots. For any B ￿ B, let
U(B) represent the total value that the buyer obtains from allocating k slots to the best
k products in B: obviously, if B has less than k number of products, the total value is
computed by allocating one slot to each product in B. In particular, we de￿ne UFB ￿
U(BFB) = u1 + ::: + uk. Let BFB
i ￿ BFB \ Bi and let qFB
i represent the cardinality of
BFB
i (hence, qFB
1 + ::: + qFB
n = k) while UFB
i ￿ U(BFB
i ) = u1
i + ::: + u
qFB
i
i . Without loss of
generality, we assume that there exists nFB between 1 and n such that qFB
i ￿ 1 (that is,
BFB
i 6= ;) for i = 1;:::;nFB, and qFB
i = 0 (that is, BFB
i = ;) for i = nFB + 1;:::;n.
In this setup, we study how bundling a⁄ects the set of products occupying the buyer￿ s
slots. Precisely, we are interested in knowing when the slots are occupied by the products
in BFB. We say that an equilibrium is (socially) e¢ cient if all slots are allocated to the
products in BFB: then the ￿rst-best outcome is realized, which is the reason why we use
the superscript FB.
4.2 Contracts and games
In this section, we ￿rst describe the bilateral contracts that seller i can propose to the
buyer in our model, and then introduce the timing of the games that we study.
4.2.1 Bundling without slotting contracts
￿ Menu of bundles21
In the absence of slotting contracts (that will be de￿ned later on), the most general
contract between seller i and the buyer is that ￿rm i o⁄ers a menu of bundles with prices
fPi(Bi)gBi￿Bi: ￿rm i chooses Pi(Bi) ￿ 0 for each Bi ￿ Bi, with Pi(;) = 0. Then, if the
buyer buys bundle B1 from ￿rm 1, .., bundle Bn from ￿rm n (some of these sets may be
20If instead the buyer bears cost ￿
j





as the buyer￿ s gross value and the following analysis applies.
21Our de￿nition of menu of bundles generalizes the notion of mixed bundling used in the context of two
goods. In this case, mixed bundling means that the seller charges a price for each good and another price
for the bundle of both goods.
12empty),22 then she pays P1(B1) + ::: + Pn(Bn). Let si = fPi(Bi)gBi￿Bi denote a generic
strategy of ￿rm i and Si be the strategy space for ￿rm i.23
￿ Independent pricing plus a ￿xed fee
A particular class of menu of bundles is the strategy which is composed of individual
prices (pi1;:::;pik) and a ￿xed fee Fi ￿ 0 such that Pi(Bi) = Fi +
P
ij2Bi pij for any (non-
empty) Bi ￿ Bi. In this case, if the buyer wants to buy at least one product from ￿rm
i, she must ￿rst pay Fi for the right to buy, and then she pays the individual prices of
the products that she selects to buy. Three particular cases of ￿ independent pricing plus a
￿xed fee￿strategies are of great interest:
￿ Independent pricing: Independent pricing is an extreme case with Fi = 0, thus
Pi(Bi) =
P
ij2Bi pij for any Bi ￿ Bi.
￿ Pure bundling: Pure bundling is another extreme case with pij = 0 for each ij 2 Bi
such that Pi(Bi) = Fi for any Bi ￿ Bi. In other words, pure bundling is a deal of all-or-
nothing.
￿ Technology-renting: A technology renting strategy consists of two elements: ￿rm i
rents his production technology to the buyer by charging pij = c for each ij 2 Bi, and
extracts (part of) the buyer￿ s surplus by levying a ￿xed rental fee Fi. Let TRi be the set
of technology-renting strategies, and tri 2 TRi an element of the set. Notice that if i plays
a technology renting strategy with fee Fi, i￿ s pro￿t is Fi if the buyer buys at least one
product of i, while i￿ s pro￿t is zero otherwise.
In what follows, we use the word ￿ bundling￿for any pricing strategy in menu of bundles
which is di⁄erent from independent pricing.
4.2.2 Bundling with slotting contracts
In what follows, we will distinguish two cases depending on whether slotting contracts are
used or not. If ￿rm i does not use any slotting contract, the buyer has full freedom in
allocating the slots among all products she purchased. In contrast, if the buyer buys from
￿rm i a bundle Bi with a slotting contract (and qi = #Bi is the number of products in Bi),
the buyer must allocate qi number of slots to the products in Bi.
￿ Exclusive dealing
22In what follows, we simply write that the buyer buys B1 [ ::: [ Bn.
23In fact, for some si 2 Si, the buyer may want to buy more than one bundle from ￿rm i (for instance, if
buying two small bundles is cheaper than buying a big bundle composed of the two small ones). However,
none of our arguments or proofs below depends on the assumption that the buyer buys at most one bundle
from each ￿rm. Thus, for the sake of simple notation, we make this assumption in the rest of the paper.
13Exclusive dealing corresponds to the case in which ￿rm i o⁄ers a bundle composed of k
products with a slotting contract.
Note that under individual pricing, slotting contracts are redundant since the buyer will
not buy any product that will not occupy a slot. In section 6 we study competition among
bundles without slotting contracts, and in section 7 we allow for slotting contracts.
4.3 Timing
In sections 5 - 7, we consider a two-stage pricing game in which
￿ at stage one, each ￿rm i simultaneously makes a contract o⁄er;
￿ at stage two, the buyer decides the products (or the bundles) to buy and allocates
the slots.
At stage two, as a tie-breaking rule, we assume that in case the buyer is indi⁄erent
among di⁄erent combinations of products, she chooses the combination that maximizes her
(gross) value.24 We consider only equilibria in pure strategies.
5 Individual pricing
In this section we consider the case in which each ￿rm uses individual pricing: each ￿rm
i chooses p
j
i for his product with value u
j







net value of product ij, for any ij 2 B. In this game it is straightforward to describe the
behavior of the buyer: she maximizes her utility by buying the k products with the highest
net values, provided that these values are non-negative.
Proposition 1 (independent pricing) When each ￿rm uses individual pricing we ￿nd that
(i) any equilibrium, if it exists, is e¢ cient.
(ii) Suppose nFB ￿ 2. If an equilibrium exists, then there exists a number wFB such that
w
j




(iii) Suppose nFB ￿ 2. Suppose also that the product with gross value uk+1 is owned by a
￿rm i￿ such that BFB
i￿ 6= ;, and uk+1 ￿ uk+2 > c: Then no equilibrium exists
24This tie-breaking rule is standard in that it is basically equivalent to the following rule applied to two
￿rms producing a homogenous good with di⁄erent marginal costs. In Bertrand equilibrium, if the cost
di⁄erential is not large, both ￿rms charge the price equal to the highest marginal cost and the tie is broken
by assuming that all consumers buy the good from the ￿rm with the lower marginal cost.
14Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1(i)-(ii) describes some properties of equilibria under independent pricing:
in any equilibrium the slots are occupied by the products in BFB, and the net values of these
products are all equal to a common value which is the highest net value among products
outside BFB (when these products are priced at c). On the other hand, Proposition 1(iii)
gives a su¢ cient condition for equilibrium non-existence which has two parts. First, there
are at least two ￿rms owning products in BFB and one of these ￿rms owns the k + 1st
best product; let i￿ represent the latter ￿rm and i￿j￿ the product. The second part is
uk+1 ￿uk+2 > c (which is trivially satis￿ed in the case of digital goods as long as products
have heterogenous values), which implies that the product with the highest net value among
products outside BFB is product i￿j￿. Then, on the one hand, ￿rm i￿ has an incentive to
charge a price pi￿j￿ larger than c, in order to reduce the competitive pressure on his products
in BFB. On the other hand, when pi￿j￿ > c any rival ￿rm i 6= i￿ selling a product ij in BFB
will choose u
j
i ￿ pij = w
j
i < uk+1 ￿ c, and this allows ￿rm i￿ to ￿nd a pro￿table deviation
that induces the buyer to replace product ij with product i￿j￿. Furthermore, the example
in section 3 shows that equilibrium may not exist even when the ￿rm owning the k + 1st
best product does not own any product in BFB.
6 Bundling without slotting contracts
In this section, we study competition among sellers when bundling is allowed but slotting
contracts are prohibited. In section 6.1, we ￿rst show that each ￿rm has an incentive to
practice bundling. In section 6.2, we describe an e¢ cient Nash equilibrium (NE) for any
c ￿ 0. Section 6.3 shows that any NE is e¢ cient if c is small and identi￿es a su¢ cient
condition to make all equilibria e¢ cient for any c. Section 6.4 gives results on pro￿ts.
Section 6.5 performs robustness checks by considering heterogeneous costs or substitution
among products.
6.1 Incentive to bundle
We ￿rst describe an important property of the technology-renting strategies in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 For any pro￿le (si;s￿i), let ￿i ￿ 0 denote the pro￿t of ￿rm i given (si;s￿i).
Then, ￿rm i can make pro￿t ￿i also by playing a technology-renting strategy tri 2 TRi
instead of si, such that the ￿xed fee Fi associated with tri is equal to ￿i.
15Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that no ￿rm i loses anything by restricting attention to strategies in
TRi regardless of the strategies used by other ￿rms. We will often use this result in our
proofs. In particular, the lemma implies that each ￿rm has at least a weak incentive to
practice bundling. We now provide an example to illustrate a case in which a ￿rm, without
bundling, cannot earn the pro￿t that he can achieve with a technology renting strategy.
Example 1 Assume n = 2; c = 0; k = 3. Firm 1 has three products with values (5;3;0)
and ￿rm 2 has three products with values (4;1:9;1). Suppose that ￿rm 2 uses a technology-
renting strategy with F2 = 4. Then, by Lemma 1, ￿rm 1 can ￿nd a best response among
technology-renting strategies, and it turns out that it is optimal to charge F1 = 5:1. If
instead ￿rm 1 switches to independent pricing, each of his two best products faces the
competition from product 22, and the best ￿rm 1 can do is to sell 11 and 12 at prices
5 ￿ 1:9 = 3:1 and 3 ￿ 1:9 = 1:1, respectively, with a pro￿t of 4:2 which is inferior to 5:1:
The reason why in Example 1 independent pricing gives ￿rm 1 a smaller pro￿t than
a technology-renting strategy is the following. Under independent pricing, each product
of ￿rm 1 faces competition from ￿rm 2￿ s second-best product, which does not occupy any
slot. This is because, under independent pricing, the buyer has the option of buying (and
paying) only one product from ￿rm 1, and thus 1 cannot induce the buyer to buy both 11
and 12 if he charges prices higher than 5￿1:9 and 3￿1:9, respectively.25 In contrast, under
bundling (or technology-renting), the buyer needs to pay a ￿xed fee if he wants to buy at
least one product of ￿rm 1; by paying this fee the buyer gets both products of 1 (even
though the buyer can use only one of them, it does not allow her to save any payment).
Thus 1 can set F1 taking into account that if the buyer refuses to pay F1, she will consume
the products of ￿rm 2 with values 1:9 and 1, which means that the two products of ￿rm 1
compete in aggregate with the aggregate of the second-best and the third-best products of
￿rm 2; this allows ￿rm 1 to realize a higher pro￿t: 5:1 is derived from 5 + 3 ￿ 1:9 ￿ 1. In
other words, bundling allows ￿rm 1 to soften competition from rival products.
Lemma 1 and Example 1 together imply
Proposition 2 (incentive to bundle) Each ￿rm has at least a weak and sometimes a strict
incentive to practice bundling instead of independent pricing.
25Since 2 uses a technology renting stategy with F2 = 4, the buyer will rent 2￿ s technology (in order to
buy at least product 21), and this makes products 22 and 23 available to the buyer at zero marginal price.
166.2 An e¢ cient equilibrium
In this section, we show that an e¢ cient equilibrium exists for any c ￿ 0; in this equilibrium
each ￿rm i uses a technology-renting strategy, and thus we can think that the strategy space
for each ￿rm i is given by [0;+1), the set of possible values of Fi.
In this equilibrium, Fi = 0 for i = nFB +1;:::;n, which means that the pro￿t is zero for
each ￿rm without products in BFB. For i = 1;:::;nFB, instead, let B￿i represent the set
[h6=iBh of products in the portfolios of ￿rms di⁄erent from i, where ￿i represents all ￿rms
except ￿rm i. In order to understand the equilibrium value of Fi, we need to know the
best alternative portfolio of products that the buyer can build up to occupy the slots when
she does not buy any product from ￿rm i. More precisely, we suppose that the buyer has
already rented the technologies of all other ￿rms, and therefore she can buy each product
in B￿i at the marginal price c. The buyer is considering whether to rent also the technology
of ￿rm i (i.e., she views i as the marginal seller), and now we determine the highest Fi ￿rm
i can charge to induce the buyer to rent i￿ s technology.
For this purpose, let u
j
￿i represent the value of the j-th best product among the products
in B￿i. Then, if c = 0 (for instance) the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does
not buy any product from i is made by the products with values (u1
￿i;:::;uk
￿i). However, if
c > 0, u
q
￿i < c may hold for some q ￿ k. Then, the best alternative portfolio is composed
of less than k number of products since the buyer will not buy any product with value
smaller than c. We below describe the best alternative portfolio for any c.
Let BFB
￿i ￿ BFBnBFB
i denote the set of the ￿rst best products in B￿i. Obviously, BFB
￿i
will be included in the best alternative portfolio since every product in BFB has a value
larger than c. Note also that BFB
￿i includes exactly k ￿ qFB
i number of products. Now
let BSB
￿i represent the subset of the best products in B￿inBFB
￿i such that the value of each
product in BSB
￿i is not smaller than c and the cardinality of BSB
￿i , denoted by qSB
￿i , is not
larger than qFB
i ; qFB
i is the number of available slots, after k ￿qFB
i have been occupied by
BFB
￿i . Therefore qSB
￿i is the number in f0;:::;qFB
i g with the following property:
￿ if c > u
k￿qFB
i +1
￿i , then qSB
￿i = 0;
￿ if uk






￿i ￿ c > uk
￿i, then qSB
￿i is the number in f1;:::;qFB










From the de￿nition of BSB
￿i , when the buyer does not buy anything from i, the best
alternative portfolio is given by BFB
￿i [BSB
















is the total (gross) value from BSB
￿i . Therefore, without renting i￿ s technology, the buyer￿ s
payo⁄ is the net value she obtains from the best alternative portfolio: UA





h6=i Fh. If the buyer rents also i￿ s technology, she ends up consuming the ￿rst best
portfolio, as each product is available to her at a marginal price of c, and obtains a payo⁄
equal to UFB ￿ck￿
P
h6=i Fh￿Fi. Firm i wants to choose the highest Fi which induces the
buyer to rent the technology, namely the Fi that makes the two payo⁄s equal; we denote
it with F ￿
i (obviously, a value of Fi higher than F ￿
i would induce the buyer not to rent i￿ s
technology).
Precisely, let tr￿
i denote the technology renting strategy of ￿rm i in which the ￿xed fee
F ￿
i is given by:
F ￿
i = UFB ￿ ck ￿ [UA







￿i ) for i = 1;:::;nFB
F ￿
i = 0 for i = nFB + 1;:::;n:
(1)
As we mentioned above, F ￿
i is equal to the di⁄erence between the total value of the ￿rst
best portfolio (net of the cost of producing it) and the total value of the best alternative
portfolio (net of the cost of producing it); for instance, in the case of Digital goods (i.e.,
c = 0), F ￿
i is simply equal to UFB ￿ UA
￿i = UFB
i ￿ USB
￿i . The value of F ￿
i makes the buyer
indi⁄erent between renting i￿ s technology or not, and thus if each ￿rm i sets Fi = F ￿
i , the
buyer buys all products in BFB and the outcome is e¢ cient.
The next proposition establishes that the pro￿le (tr￿
1;:::;tr￿
n) is a Nash equilibrium: We
call this equilibrium the technology-renting equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (technology-renting equilibrium) For any c ￿ 0, there exists a NE in which
each ￿rm i uses the technology-renting strategy tr￿
i and this equilibrium is e¢ cient. In this
NE, ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t is F ￿




￿i ) ￿ ￿￿
0.
Proof. See the Appendix for the complete proof. We here provide a sketch of the proof.
We ￿rst show that given (tr￿
1;:::;tr￿
n), the buyer buys BFB
i for i = 1;:::;nFB. And then we
prove that there is no pro￿table deviation for any ￿rm. For this purpose, from Lemma 1,
it is enough to consider ￿rm i￿ s deviations in the set TRi of technology-renting strategies.
Obviously, ￿rm i has no incentive to decrease Fi below F ￿
i ; ￿rm i has no incentive to
increase Fi above F ￿
i since we show that then the buyer will not buy any product from ￿rm
i.
Our technology-renting equilibrium to some extent generalizes the marginal cost pricing
result in the literature on competition in non-linear pricing (Armstrong-Vickers, 2001, 2008
18and Rochet-Stole 2002) to a situation in which each ￿rm can produce any number of
products.
In the technology-renting equilibrium, the buyer builds up the ￿rst best portfolio BFB
and ￿lls the slots with it. This generates a social surplus equal to UFB ￿ ck which is split
among the ￿rms and the buyer as follows: ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t is F ￿
i for i = 1;:::;n, and the




￿i ). Furthermore, F ￿
i can be interpreted in terms of the
payment received by seller i in the pivotal Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. If qFB
i = 0,
seller i is not pivotal and hence his payment is zero (i.e. F ￿
i = 0). If instead qFB
i > 0, seller




In his presence, the sum of utilities of all other players is UFB ￿c(k￿qFB
i ). The di⁄erence








, which is equal to F ￿
i +cqFB
i and makes i
realize a pro￿t of F ￿
i .
The following example illustrates the technology-renting equilibrium.
Example 2 (Illustration of the technology-renting equilibrium) Consider the case in which










Then pij = 3; F ￿
1 = (12 ￿ 3) ￿ (5 ￿ 3) = 7 and F ￿
2 = (10 ￿ 3) ￿ (8 ￿ 3) = 2.
6.3 E¢ ciency
In this subsection, we ￿rst illustrate a case in which an ine¢ cient equilibrium arises for
c > 0 because of pure bundling. And then we show that (i) all equilibria are e¢ cient for c
small enough; (ii) the same result holds for any c if ￿rms are restricted to marginal prices
which are not smaller than c.
6.3.1 An ine¢ cient equilibrium
The game we are considering may have many NE di⁄erent from (tr￿
1;:::;tr￿
n), and some of
them can be ine¢ cient as the following example illustrates.
Example 3 (pure bundling and ine¢ ciency) Consider the setting of Example 2: k = 2,










19In the following NE, each ￿rm i plays a pure bundling strategy and the buyer buys f11;12g
rather than BFB = f11;21g:
s1 2 S1 is such that F1 = 11, p11 = p12 = 0;
s2 2 S2 is such that F2 = 6, p21 = p22 = 0:
In the above example, given (s1;s2), the buyer buys B1 and gets a payo⁄ of 9. Under
pure bundling, ￿rm 1 induces the buyer to buy product 12 even though this product does
not belong to BFB, and ￿rm 2 is unable to sell the superior product 21 for the two following
reasons. First, from the all-or-nothing deal, given that the buyer buys 11, her marginal
cost of getting product 12 is p12 = 0. Second, in order not to make a loss, ￿rm 2 must
charge a price for 21 at least equal to c = 3 while the buyer￿ s gain from replacing 12 with
21 is 2.
6.3.2 E¢ ciency for c small
The previous reasoning regarding example 3 also suggests that the result may be di⁄erent
(i.e., the ine¢ cient equilibrium may disappear) if c were smaller than 2, as this makes 10￿c
larger than 8 and therefore ￿rm 2 could induce the buyer to replace 12 with 21 and make a
positive pro￿t. Indeed, we can prove that if c < uk ￿ uk+1 then in any NE the buyer buys
BFB. This makes the issue of multiplicity not very serious from the point of view of social
welfare.
Proposition 4 (e¢ ciency for c small) When bundling is allowed, all Nash equilibria are
e¢ cient (i.e., in any NE, the buyer buys the set BFB) if c < uk ￿ uk+1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 holds because of the argument made above regarding Example 3. Suppose
that a pro￿le of strategies (s1;:::;sn) induces the buyer to buy B = B1 [:::[Bn such that
product ij belongs to BFB but not to B, while product i0j0 belongs to B and not to BFB.
Then ￿rm i can induce the buyer to buy Bi[fijg for an extra outlay of c+" and to give ij
the slot previously assigned to i0j0, since the buyer increases her pro￿t by u
j







i0 > c because uk ￿ uk+1 > c. Notice that this argument does not require that
the buyer stops buying product i0j0, since Pi0(Bi0nfi0j0g) may be larger than Pi0(Bi0).26
26We are using the free disposal assumption, which makes sense in this section where there is no slotting
contract. In the next section where the buyer can sign slotting contracts, free disposal is still assumed as
long as it does not violate the slotting contracts signed by the buyer.
20It is very interesting to note the similarity between the condition c < uk ￿ uk+1 in
Proposition 4 that makes all equilibria e¢ cient under bundling and the condition c <
uk+1￿uk+2 in Proposition 1(iii) that makes equilibrium not exist under independent pricing.
In particular, in the case of digital goods, both conditions are trivially satis￿ed as long as
products have heterogenous values. Then, allowing bundling changes the market outcome
dramatically from non-existence of equilibrium to "all market outcomes are e¢ cient".
Next, we give a simple corollary of Proposition 4:
Corollary 1 In the case of digital goods,
(i) if bundling is forbidden, as long as the ￿rm owning the k + 1st best product owns a
product in BFB (and there is no monopoly of BFB), no equilibrium exists;
(ii) if bundling is allowed, at least one equilibrium exists and all equilibria are e¢ cient.
Therefore a policy of laissez-faire regarding bundling achieves e¢ ciency.
The corollary has an important policy implication. In the case of digital goods, when
bundling is allowed, each ￿rm has an incentive to practice bundling (proposition 2), at
least one equilibrium exists (Proposition 3), and all equilibria are e¢ cient (Proposition
4). Therefore, we can conclude that in the case of digital goods, a policy of laissez-faire
achieves e¢ ciency.
6.3.3 Achieving e¢ ciency for c not small
Example 3 shows that ine¢ cient equilibria can exist for c large. In this section, we show
that e¢ ciency holds in any equilibrium if ￿rms are prohibited from setting the marginal
price27 of any product below its cost c: Precisely, we consider the following restriction for
￿rm i￿ s strategies:
for any ij 2 Bi and any Bi ￿ Bi such that ij = 2 Bi,
Pi(Bi [ fijg) ￿ Pi(Bi) ￿ c for i = 1;:::;n.
(2)
The meaning of (2) is that as the number of objects in a bundle of ￿rm i increases, the
price of the bundle needs to increase at least by the cost of the additional products in the
bundle. As a consequence, if ￿rm i is interested in selling a particular bundle Bi for a
certain price P ￿, condition (2) forces him to make each subset of Bi available at a price
strictly (weakly) smaller than P ￿ if c > 0 (if c = 0) such that the buyer can save at least
c by cancelling a product within Bi. In particular, the condition makes it impossible for
27By the marginal price we mean the increase in the price of a bundle when an additional product is
added to the bundle.
21a ￿rm to use the pure bundling strategy (i.e., to propose only a single bundle by charging
only a ￿xed fee) for c > 0. Note that an ￿ independent pricing plus ￿xed fee￿strategy
satis￿es (2) if and only if pij ￿ c for any ij (i.e., if each individual price is larger than the
cost) and in particular every technology-renting strategy satis￿es (2). Thus, from Lemma
1 we know that ￿rm i can ￿nd a best response to s￿i in the set of strategies satisfying (2),
for any s￿i.
Under the restriction (2) we can show that all the NEs are e¢ cient for any c.28
Proposition 5 (e¢ ciency for any c) Suppose that each ￿rm must satisfy (2). Then, all
equilibria are e¢ cient for any c ￿ 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the e¢ ciency result of Proposition 5 is somewhat linked to the intuition
for Proposition 4. Suppose that a pro￿le of strategies (s1;:::;sn) induces the buyer to buy
B = B1 [ ::: [ Bn such that product ij belongs to BFB but not to B, while product
i0j0 belongs to B and not to BFB. When (2) holds, ￿rm i can increase his pro￿t by
inducing the buyer to replace i0j0 with ij (with the latter product priced marginally at
c + ") because cancelling i0j0 allows the buyer to save at least c, and thus the buyer earns
at least u
j
i ￿ (c + ") ￿ (u
j0
i0 ￿ c) > 0 from replacing i0j0 with ij.
Remark 1: In the practice of competition policy, ￿rms￿charging prices below cost
have been discussed in the context of predation: Areeda and Turner (1975) were the ￿rst
to propose to use pricing below costs to identify predation. Our model does not deal
with predation, but interestingly Proposition 5 shows that prohibiting ￿rms from charging
individual prices (or marginal prices) below costs makes all equilibria e¢ cient in our static
pricing game.
6.4 Pro￿ts
In this subsection, we study sellers￿payo⁄s under bundling and then study how bundling
a⁄ects pro￿ts. For the ￿rst part, we have:
Proposition 6 (pro￿ts) When bundling is allowed;
(i) In the case of digital goods, in any equilibrium ￿rm i realizes at least a pro￿t of F ￿
i , the
pro￿t in the technology-renting equilibrium, for i = 1;:::;n.
(ii) When n = 2, in any NE the pro￿t of ￿rm i is not larger than F ￿
i , for i = 1;2.
28Not surprisingly, condition (2) is violated by the strategy of ￿rm 1 in example 3.
22(iii) When n = 2 and each ￿rm must satisfy (2), in any NE the pro￿t of ￿rm i is equal to
F ￿
i , for i = 1;2.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 6(i) is straightforward since when c = 0, ￿rm i certainly makes pro￿t F ￿
i by
playing the technology renting strategy with Fi = F ￿
i , independently of the strategies played
by the other ￿rms. Indeed, even though the other ￿rms were to give away their products




to replace the products in BSB
￿i with the products in BFB
i .
The intuition for proposition 6(ii) is that when n = 2, F ￿
1 makes the buyer indi⁄erent
between buying BFB
1 from 1 (at the marginal price cqFB
1 ) and buying BSB
￿1 from 2 (at the
marginal price cqSB
￿1 ). Then, if 1 attempts to make a pro￿t larger than F ￿
1, 2 can increase
his pro￿t by inducing the buyer to buy BSB
￿1 at a price a bit higher than cqSB
￿1 . Furthermore,
when each ￿rm is required to charge a marginal price larger than or equal to c, we can pin
down the equilibrium pro￿t of each ￿rm and show that it is equal to F ￿
i .
Propositions 4, 5, and 6 imply
Corollary 2 Suppose that n = 2.
(i) The technology-renting equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium in terms of
sellers￿payo⁄s.
(ii) In the case of digital goods or when each ￿rm must satisfy (2), in all equilibria the
outcome is identical to that of the technology-renting equilibrium in terms of allocation of
slots and of each player￿ s payo⁄.
Not surprisingly, each seller￿ s pro￿t is lower in the ine¢ cient equilibrium of example 3
than in the technology-renting equilibrium of example 2.
Remark 2: Corollary 2(i) is similar to the ￿nding of Bernheim and Whinston (1998)
and O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1997) that Pareto undominated equilibria maximize the joint
payo⁄s of all sellers and the (single) buyer.
Remark 3: For n > 2, it is more di¢ cult to pin down each ￿rm￿ s equilibrium pro￿t.
When all ￿rms are required to satisfy (2), we can show that ￿rm i can realize at least a
pro￿t equal to F ￿
i (in fact, this is proven in the proof of Proposition 6(iii) for an arbitrary
n ￿ 2); but we have been unable to establish that F ￿
i is also an upper bound for the pro￿t
of ￿rm i.
We now study how bundling a⁄ects pro￿ts.
23Proposition 7 (pro￿t comparison) Assume that nFB ￿ 2 and that an equilibrium exists
under independent pricing.
(i) Each seller i￿ s pro￿t under independent pricing is weakly smaller than F ￿
i .
(ii) For any seller i = 1;:::;nFB, his pro￿t under independent pricing is strictly smaller
than F ￿
i unless uk+1 = u
k￿qFB
i +1
￿i = ::: = uk
￿i holds.
Proof. From Proposition 1(ii), we know that the pro￿t of ￿rm i (for i ￿ nFB) has an








































i , and uk+1 ￿ u
k￿qFB
i +1





This proves that the inequality is satis￿ed strictly unless uk+1 = u
k￿qFB
i +1
￿i = ::: = uk
￿i holds.
Proposition 1(i)-(ii) show that if an equilibrium exists under independent pricing, it is
e¢ cient and each product of i which is sold faces competition from the best product in
BnBFB. As we already noticed, bundling changes competition among individual products
into competition among portfolios: now BFB
i competes with BSB
￿i . Therefore, unless all
products in BSB
￿i have the same value equal to uk+1, bundling strictly increases i￿ s pro￿t
for ￿rm i = 1;:::;nFB.
6.5 Robustness
In this subsection, we perform two robustness checks.
6.5.1 The case of heterogenous costs
We can show that our notation can be modi￿ed to extend all the previous results in this
section to the case in which production costs are heterogenous, that is the production cost
of ￿rm i for product ij is c
j






i as the value
of product ij net of production cost and order products of ￿rm i according to these net
values such that v1
i ￿ v2
i ￿ ::: ￿ vk
i . We use vj and v
j
￿i to denote the value of the j-th best
product among all products in B or in B￿i, respectively, and we suppose that vk > vk+1 > 0.
For B ￿ B, let V (B) represent the total net value that the buyer obtains from allocating
the slots to the k products with highest net value in B (if #B ￿ k), when she pays the
production cost for each such product. Let V FB ￿ V (BFB) and BFB
￿i ￿ BFBnBFB
i , a set
which includes exactly k ￿ qFB
i number of products. Now let BSB
￿i represent the subset of
24the best products in B￿inBFB
￿i such that the net value of each product in BSB
￿i is not smaller
than 0 and the cardinality of BSB
￿i , denoted by qSB
￿i , is not larger than qFB
i . Therefore qSB
￿i
is the number in f0;:::;qFB
i g with the following property:
￿ if 0 > v
k￿qFB
i +1
￿i , then qSB
￿i = 0;
￿ if vk






￿i ￿ 0 > vk
￿i, then qSB
￿i is the number in f1;:::;qFB










A technology renting strategy for ￿rm i is de￿ned as pij = c
j
i for j = 1;:::;k together
with Fi, and Lemma 1 holds. Proposition 3 holds with F ￿
i = V FB ￿ V A




￿i ). Proposition 4 holds if vk > maxij2BnBFB u
j
i and Proposition 5 holds under
the restriction Pi(Bi [ fijg) ￿ Pi(Bi) ￿ c
j
i.
6.5.2 The case of substitutes
In this subsection we consider substitution among products. Since it is hard to describe all
possible substitutions for every possible subset of B, we consider a simple case of substitu-
tion and show that our results are robust. Precisely, we assume that if the buyer buys the
set of products B ￿ B with q = #(B), then there is a number s > 0 such that her gross
utility from the products in B is given by U(B)￿(q￿1)s, and s is small enough to satisfy
uk+1 ￿s > c. With this subadditive utility function we represent a negative synergy which
has a constant magnitude as the number of products used by the buyer increases.












i. Then it is simple to see that U(B) ￿ (q ￿ 1)s = ~ U(B) + s. In other words, the buyer￿ s
gross utility from bundle B is given by ~ U(B), except for the constant s. Then everything
happens as if the value of each product has been reduced by s, and thus the technology
renting equilibrium still exists, albeit with di⁄erent ￿xed fees. As a general result we ￿nd
that both the ￿rms and the buyer make (weakly) lower pro￿ts in this equilibrium than when
s = 0; the driving force for this result is that the social value which is generated by trade is
lower because of the substitution. In particular, the buyer￿ s pro￿t is strictly reduced. The
pro￿t of each ￿rm i = 1;:::;nFB is also reduced, unless qFB
i = qSB
￿i and uk
￿i￿s ￿ c. Finally,
the results about e¢ cient equilibria are unchanged by the negative synergy.
257 Bundling with slotting contracts
In this section we study a setting in which each ￿rm i can use slotting contracts. When
￿rm i uses slotting contracts, buying a bundle Bi requires the buyer to allocate slots to all
products in Bi; therefore, if all ￿rms use slotting contracts, the buyer can buy B1 [:::[Bn
only if #(B1[:::[Bn) ￿ k. By using slotting contracts, it may be possible (and pro￿table)
for ￿rm i to induce the buyer to buy a bundle bigger than BFB
i , in order to make sales of
the rival ￿rms di¢ cult. In extreme cases, i may succeed in occupying all slots with his own
products by setting Pi(Bi) very high for each Bi 6= Bi and choosing Pi(Bi) to induce the
buyer to buy Bi, as it occurs in the following example.














Here BFB = f11;21;22g, so that qFB
1 = 1 and qFB
2 = 2. However, there exists an ine¢ cient
NE in which Pi(Bi) is high enough for each Bi 6= Bi, for i = 1;2, and P1(B1) = 5,
P2(B2) = 0. In words, each ￿rm i o⁄ers only Bi through a slotting contract, and Bertrand
competition between B1 and B2 determines the above prices. In this NE, ￿rm 1 occupies
the three slots even though products 21 and 22 are both better than 12 and 13.
This example shows that even in the case of digital goods, ine¢ cient equilibria exist
when ￿rms can use slotting contracts; this contrasts with Proposition 4, which shows that
e¢ ciency is always achieved for small values of c without slotting contracts. The reason
for why such a result does not hold with slotting contracts is that a ￿rm i with a product
ij 2 BFB may not be able to induce the buyer to modify her portfolio by replacing an
inferior product of a rival ￿rm with product ij, even though ￿rm i charges a very small
price, in case the rival ￿rm uses a slotting contract. Indeed, all three products of ￿rm 1
are bounded with the slotting contract such that replacing for instance product 13 with
product 21 implies that the buyer cannot use any product of ￿rm 1, which is unpro￿table
for the buyer. On the contrary, without slotting contracts, after buying B1, the buyer can
freely dispose of any product in B1 to replace it with a superior product.
In spite of Example 4, we can show that Lemma 1 holds and the technology-renting
equilibrium described by Proposition 3 is a NE also under slotting contracts and thus an
e¢ cient NE always exists in this setting. Furthermore, also Propositions 5 and 6 hold in
this environment.
Corollary 3 Regardless of whether each ￿rm can use slotting contracts or not,
26(i) a ￿rm can ￿nd a best response among technology-renting strategies without using slotting
contracts;
(ii) there exists a technology-renting equilibrium: the pro￿le (tr￿
1;:::;tr￿
n) described in (1) is
a NE for any c ￿ 0;
(iii) every NE is e¢ cient under condition (2);
(iv) if n = 2, the technology-renting equilibrium Pareto dominates any other NE.
Proof. For the proof of (i) we can follow the proof of Lemma 1 to show that ￿given a
pro￿le of strategies of other ￿rms ￿￿rm i does not lose anything from using a suitable
technology renting strategy without the clause of slotting contracts. For the proof of (ii)-
(iv), we notice that in the proofs of Proposition 3, 5 and 6(ii) we never use the possibility
that the buyer does not allocate a slot to a product she has purchased. In other words,
in the equilibria of Proposition 3, 5 and 6(ii), the buyer buys only the products that she
will use. This di⁄ers from the proof of Proposition 4, which indeed does not apply under
slotting contracts, as Example 4 proves.
Corollary 3(iii) suggests that if ￿rms are prohibited from charging marginal prices below
costs, all equilibria are e¢ cient regardless of whether they can use slotting contracts. This
result is not surprising since, as we said in subsection 6.3.3, condition (2) makes pure
bundling impossible and, when a ￿rm o⁄ers a bundle, forces each ￿rm to o⁄er a complete
subset of the bundle as well.29 This in turn allows the buyer to buy only the products that
would occupy a slot and makes slotting contracts redundant.
While corollary 3(iv) holds for duopoly, the following example shows that there can be
a Pareto undominated ine¢ cient equilibrium if there are more than two ￿rms.
Example 5 (slotting contracts and Pareto undominated ine¢ cient equilibria). Suppose




















Here BFB = f11;21;31g and qFB
1 = 1, F ￿
1 = 2. However, there exists an ine¢ cient
equilibrium in which each ￿rm i proposes only the bundle Bi of all his products and uses
the slotting contract. Prices are P1(B1) = 5, P2(B2) = 0, P3(B3) = 0. In this equilibrium,
￿rm 1 occupies all slots and his pro￿t is 5 (> F ￿
1).
29Our condition (2) to some extent formalizes the conjecture of Bernheim-Whinston (1986) that ine¢ cient
equilibria would disappear if every bidder (seller) makes a serious bid (price o⁄er) on all possible allocations
(subsets of his portfolio).
278 Portfolio e⁄ects of Bundling
In this section, we identify portfolio e⁄ects of bundling and analyze the consequences on
a horizontal merger. For this purpose, we focus our discussion on the technology-renting
equilibrium in which each seller i makes a pro￿t of F ￿
i .
8.1 Portfolio e⁄ects
Proposition 1(ii) shows that under independent pricing, all products sold give the same
net values to the buyer. This implies that two products of identical values must be sold at
the same prices. This is not necessarily the case with bundling because of portfolio e⁄ects.
By portfolio e⁄ects of bundling, we mean that two ￿rms who end up selling products
with the same values can make di⁄erent pro￿ts. Consider the setting with digital goods







for j = 1;:::;qFB




2 for j = qFB



















In addition, if BSB
￿1 \ B2 6= ￿ then USB
￿1 < USB
￿2 and thus F ￿
1 > F ￿
2: the buyer ends up
purchasing products of identical values from both ￿rms but pays a higher price to ￿rm
1. This is because in equilibrium each ￿rm i extracts with F ￿
i the surplus that the buyer
obtains by replacing the products belonging to BSB
￿i with the products belonging to BFB
i .
From another point of view, F ￿
i can also be written as F ￿
i = UFB ￿ UA
￿i and UFB is the
same for all ￿rms while UA
￿i is smaller for ￿rms with better portfolios.
Corollary 4 (portfolio e⁄ects) Bundling generates portfolio e⁄ects, which do not exist un-







2 for j = 1;:::;qFB




2 for j = qFB
1 + 1;:::;k. Then, in the technology-
renting equilibrium, the buyer buys products of identical values from both ￿rms (i.e., BFB
1
from 1 and BFB
2 from 2) but pays F ￿
1 ￿ F ￿
2. In addition, if BSB
￿1 \ B2 6= ￿, then F ￿
1 > F ￿
2.
8.2 Portfolio e⁄ects and horizontal merger
A natural and important consequence of the portfolio e⁄ects is that it creates incentives
for a horizontal merger. We will ￿rst consider a merger between two given ￿rms and then
make the merger endogenous.
Consider the merger of any two ￿rms i and h (with i 6= h) and let the two ￿rms after
the merger be denoted by i + h.
28Proposition 8 (exogenous merger) Consider the merger of any two ￿rms i and h.
(i) The merger a⁄ects neither social welfare nor any other ￿rm￿ s pro￿t.
(ii) The merger weakly increases the merging ￿rms￿pro￿t, and hence weakly decreases the
buyer￿ s payo⁄.
In case qFB
i ￿ 1 and qFB
h ￿ 1, the merger strictly increases the merging ￿rms￿pro￿t, and
hence strictly decreases the buyer￿ s pro￿t, unless maxfu
k￿qFB
i +1







i ￿ 1 and qFB






Social welfare is not a⁄ected by the merger since the buyer buys the products in BFB
regardless of the market structure of the sellers. The pro￿t of a ￿rm i0 di⁄erent from i and
h is not a⁄ected by the merger since the pro￿t of i0 is the di⁄erence between the value of
the best portfolio BFB and the value of the best alternative portfolio BFB
￿i0 [ BSB
￿i0 that the
buyer can build up without buying any product from ￿rm i0. Since the composition of both
BFB
￿i0 and BSB
￿i0 is not a⁄ected by the merger, the merger does not change the pro￿t of any
third ￿rm.
The merger is pro￿table since it weakens the best alternative portfolio. Before the
merger, if the buyer does not buy any product from i, the best alternative portfolio may
include products from h. In contrast, after the merger, the best alternative portfolio does
not include products from h, which implies that after the merger ￿rm i + h faces a weaker
competition than the one faced by ￿rm i before the merger (and also a weaker competition
than the one faced by ￿rm h before the merger). This allows the merged ￿rm to command
a higher price than the sum of the pre-merger prices of i and h.
The conditions in the proposition under which the merger does not increase the pro￿ts
of the merging ￿rms are very stringent. For instance, when qFB
i ￿ 1 and qFB
h ￿ 1, then the











￿(i+h) ￿ c holds and thus neither ￿rm i nor ￿rm h





h are the pro￿ts of i and h before the merger while














￿(i+h) = u for some u ￿ c. In this case, i + j faces as ￿erce












We now make the merger endogenous in the following way. Suppose that a given ￿rm h
sells a product in his portfolio with value u > c for some exogenous reasons. We determine
29the value that each ￿rm i(6= h) attaches to acquiring this product. From proposition 8,
as any merger does not a⁄ect a third ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, if a ￿rm di⁄erent from ￿rm i buys the
product, then ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t is unchanged with respect to the pro￿t before the sale. If
instead ￿rm i buys the product, then his pro￿t increases only when the product belongs to
BFB
￿i [BSB
￿i : in this case, the pro￿t of i increases by u￿maxfu
k+1
￿i ;cg. For instance, if u
k+1
￿i ￿
c, i￿ s purchase of h￿ s product will modify the best alternative portfolio that the buyer can
build up when she does not buy any product from i such that in the portfolio, the product
bought from h is replaced by a product with value u
k+1





￿i , which increases i￿ s pro￿t by u￿u
k+1
￿i : If u
k+1
￿i < c, the product bought from h





is reduced by u ￿ c, so that i￿ s pro￿t increases by u ￿ c.
If we assume that ￿rm h uses a second price auction, we get the following result.
Proposition 9 Suppose that ￿rm h sells a product in his portfolio with value u(> c)
through a second-price auction.


















i for j = 1;2;:::;k ￿ qFB
1 and for i = 2;:::;n,
then b1 ￿ bi for i = 2;:::;n. Therefore, there is a tendency of increasing concentration.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 9(ii) suggests that there is a tendency of increasing concentration since the
dominating ￿rm has a higher willingness to pay for the product in auction. In order to
give the intuition, we suppose h 6= 1, h 6= 2 and compare 1￿ s bid with 2￿ s bid. Note that
from the de￿nition of the dominance, the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does
not buy any product from 1 is worse than the one when the buyer does not buy anything
from 2. Therefore, only two cases may arise: either h￿ s product on sale belongs to both
portfolios or it belongs only to the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does not buy
anything from 1. In the second case, it is clear that 1 makes a positive bid while 2 makes
zero bid. In the ￿rst case, we need to think which product is going to replace h￿ s product
in the best alternative portfolio. Since the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does
not buy anything from 1 is inferior to the one when the buyer does not buy anything from
2, the product replacing h￿ s product is worse in the ￿rst portfolio than in the second. This
implies that 1 gains more than 2 from purchasing the product of ￿rm h.
30Remark 4: Our proposition 8 is similar to the results that O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er ￿nd
(Propositions 4-6) when they study a horizontal merger in a Nash bargaining setup; but
they do not make the merger endogenous as we do in Proposition 9.
9 Policy implications and concluding remarks
In this section, we derive policy implications from our results and discuss issues for future
studies.
9.1 E¢ cient allocation of slots
When we consider a static setting and focus on e¢ cient allocation of slots, our results gen-
erate the following policy implications. First, bundling such as o⁄ering a menu of bundles
or ￿ individual prices plus a ￿xed fee￿is socially desirable and should be allowed. Second,
regarding pure bundling, in the case of digital goods, the technology-renting strategy is
identical to pure bundling and therefore pure bundling of all products belonging to a ￿rm
achieves e¢ cient allocation and is socially desirable. This implies that block booking of
movies is socially desirable. In contrast, in the case of physical goods, pure bundling can
create ine¢ cient equilibria and hence competition authority should be careful. Third, re-
garding slotting contracts, in the case of digital goods, our analysis implies that prohibiting
slotting contracts is socially desirable since then all equilibria are e¢ cient. In contrast, in
the case of physical goods, ine¢ cient equilibria can arise either because of charging marginal
prices below costs (in the absence of slotting contracts) or because of slotting contracts.
Although we have shown that prohibiting ￿rms from charging marginal prices below costs
makes all equilibria e¢ cient, in practice it may be di¢ cult to monitor whether ￿rms charge
marginal prices below costs (De la Mano-Durand, 2005). Then, prohibiting only slotting
contracts may not be enough to achieve e¢ cient allocations.
9.2 Foreclosure
Even though we have not formally investigated the issue of foreclosure, our results have
some implications on how bundling and slotting contracts a⁄ect foreclosure.
Consider ￿rst bundling. As we noted in section 2.2, in Whinston (1990)￿ s revival of the
leverage theory, pure bundling serves as a commitment device to be aggressive and therefore
can allow to foreclose a rival ￿rm. On the contrary, in our paper, bundling (pure bundling in
the case of digital goods) allows a ￿rm to extract more surplus from the buyer by softening
competition from rival products. For instance, in the case of digital goods, if an equilibrium
31under individual pricing exists, propositions 7 and 6(i) suggest that all ￿rms￿pro￿ts are at
least weakly higher (and often strictly higher) in any equilibrium under bundling than in
the equilibrium under individual pricing. Then bundling (or pure bundling) cannot be an
instrument of foreclosure.
This opposite prediction is due to two key di⁄erences between Whinston￿ s model and
our model. First, Whinston considers a situation in which, the tying product and the tied
product do not compete and therefore the ￿rm who sells both products does not su⁄er
from internal competition between his own products. By contrast, in our model, because of
the slot constraint, there is competition among all products including competition among
products belonging to the same ￿rm. Bundling has an e⁄ect of removing internal compe-
tition among products belonging to the same ￿rm and therefore each ￿rm can gain from
bundling. Second, Whinston assumes that once the incumbent sells the tied product to the
buyer, the rival ￿rm cannot induce the buyer to replace it with his own product and at the
same time recoup his cost. In our model, this incompatibility assumption fails to hold in
the case of digital goods.
Furthermore, we believe that the two di⁄erent models capture di⁄erent real world situa-
tions. Whinston￿ s model is well adapted to famous cases such as IBM￿ s tying of tabulating
machines with tabulating cards or Microsoft￿ s tying of Windows operating system with In-
ternet Explorer.30 In these examples, the incumbent is a monopoly in one market and faces
competition in the other market and the two products tied together are not substitutes but
complements. Our model is well adapted to competition among portfolios such as movies,
cigarettes, foods whenever their distributors have limited slots due to limited attention of
consumers or limited shelf space. For instance, the leverage theory was originally applied
to the movie industry when the Supreme Court prohibited block booking. However, in the
case of movies, it is not realistic to assume that movies produced by Paramount Pictures
do not compete among themselves while some of them compete with movies produced by
other studios. It would be reasonable, as a ￿rst approximation, to assume that all movies
compete among themselves as we do in our model.
Consider now exclusive dealing (or slotting contracts). Our results suggest that exclusive
dealing can be a direct instrument of foreclosure. For instance, consider digital goods.
Then, in the absence of slotting contracts, all equilibria are e¢ cient and each ￿rm realizes
at least the pro￿t of the technology-renting equilibrium (proposition 6(i)). However, if
slotting contracts are allowed, a ￿rm can buy all slots and foreclose rival ￿rms if this is in
his interest.
30Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Carlton and Waldman (2002) apply Whinston￿ s spirit to Microsoft￿ s
tying.
329.3 Concluding remarks
As challenging issues for future studies, it would be interesting to explore dynamic im-
plications of the portfolio e⁄ects in a setting in which we make the portfolio of each ￿rm
endogenous. We can also model the buyer as a downstream ￿rm and study the ￿rm￿ s pricing
with respect to ￿nal consumers. Even in a relatively simple setting with a monopoly down-
stream ￿rm, we can study the interaction between bundling at upstream level and bundling
at downstream level. But, of course, it would be more interesting to study competition
between downstream ￿rms, which is very relevant for cable or digital TV.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) The proof is organized in three steps
Step 1 In any NE, the buyer buys k products.
Suppose that the buyer buys less than k products, and thus she leaves some slots empty.
This implies that less than k products have positive net values. Let ij denote an object
in BFB which the buyer does not buy: then certainly its price is larger than u
j
i. Hence, a
pro￿table deviation for ￿rm i exists: set pij such that c < pij < u
j
i (notice that u
j
i > c since
35ij 2 BFB), so that one more object has positive net value. Then the buyer will still buy
the products she was buying previously, in addition to product ij, and the pro￿t of ￿rm i
will increase by pij ￿ c > 0.
Step 2 Let B denote the set of products purchased by the buyer; then w
j
i = ￿ w for any
ij 2 B, for some ￿ w ￿ 0.




i0, then ￿rm i has an incentive to deviate by increasing





i0 for any ij and i0j0 in B and we denote with ￿ w this common value.
Step 3 In any NE, the slots are occupied by the e¢ cient products, that is B = BFB.
Suppose now that the buyer buys k objects but there is some product ij in BFB which she
does not buy. Recall that all products in B have the same net value ￿ w by step 2, and let





i. Furthermore, pi0j0 ￿ c must hold, otherwise ￿rm i0 is better o⁄ not













i0 +pi0j0￿". Then ij is the product with
the highest net value, thus the buyer will buy it and drop i0j0, which has the lowest gross
value among the products we was buying previously. This deviation is pro￿table to ￿rm i:














Given that B = BFB, we use wFB instead of ￿ w.
(ii) The value of wFB is equal to maxf0;maxij2BnBFBfw
j
igg because if wFB is smaller
than maxf0;maxij2BnBFBfw
j
igg, then the buyer does not buy all the products in BFB; if
wFB > maxf0;maxij2BnBFBfw
j
igg, then each ￿rm i ￿ nFB can deviate by slightly increasing
the prices of his products in BFB
i , and the buyer will still purchase them. Now we prove
that wFB ￿ uk+1 ￿ c. If wFB < uk+1 ￿ c, consider the ￿rm i￿ which o⁄ers the product
i￿j￿ with value uk+1, and let this ￿rm set pi￿j￿ = c + " with " > 0 and small, so that
w
j￿
i￿ = uk+1 ￿c￿" > wFB: product i￿j￿ has the highest net value and the buyer purchases
it. If BFB
i￿ = ;, this is a pro￿table deviation for ￿rm i￿. If instead BFB
i￿ 6= ;, then let
this ￿rm reduce by "
k the price of each of his qFB
i products in BFB
i￿ . This guarantees that
the buyer purchases (at least) BFB





Since wFB ￿ uk+1 ￿ c, pij ￿ u
j
i ￿ (uk+1 ￿ c) holds for any ij 2 BFB and the pro￿t of ￿rm
i is weakly smaller than UFB
i ￿ uk+1qFB
i .
(iii) From (ii) we know wFB ￿ uk+1 ￿ c. uk+1 ￿ uk+2 > c implies that there is no product
ij 2 BnBFB di⁄erent from i￿j￿ such that w
j
i = wFB. Indeed, if such ij 2 BnBFB exists, we








i￿ ￿c (the ￿rst inequality comes from pij ￿ 0; the
36second one comes from uk+1 ￿ uk+2 > c), and this violates wFB ￿ u
j￿
i￿ ￿ c. Therefore, we
must have u
j￿
i￿ ￿pi￿j￿ = wFB, and thus pi￿j￿ ￿ c, and wFB > u
j0
i0 ￿pi0j0 for any i0j0 2 BnBFB,
i0j0 6= i￿j￿. Then, let ￿rm i￿ deviate by increasing both the price of object i￿j￿ and pi￿j for
any i￿j 2 BFB
i￿ 6= ; (i.e., the prices of all his products in BFB
i￿ ) by the same " > 0 such that
uk+1 ￿ pi￿j￿ ￿ " is larger than u
j0
i0 ￿ pi0j0 for any i0j0 2 BnBFB, i0j0 6= i￿j￿. Then the buyer
still buys all products in BFB, and i￿￿ s pro￿t is increased.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider any arbitrary pro￿le of strategies (si;s￿i) and let ￿i be the pro￿t of ￿rm i
given (si;s￿i). We show that i can achieve the same pro￿t ￿i by playing tri 2 TRi such
that Fi = ￿i. This fact is obvious if ￿i = 0 and therefore we consider the case of ￿i > 0. In
order to prove this result, it su¢ ces to show that the buyer buys at least one product from i
when i plays tri. We ￿nd that, (i) given (tri;s￿i), the buyer can make the same payo⁄that
she makes with (si;s￿i) since she can buy the same products, with the same outlay; (ii)
given (tri;s￿i), the buyer cannot realize a higher payo⁄ than with (si;s￿i) without buying
at least one product of ￿rm i, because otherwise she would not buy anything from i given
(si;s￿i), and this contradicts ￿i > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
We split the proof into two steps.
Step 1 When the sellers play (tr￿
1;:::;tr￿
n), the buyer buys the products in BFB and
thus each ￿rm i￿ s pro￿t is F ￿





We start by proving by contradiction that the buyer buys at least some products from (say)
￿rm 1; the same argument applies for ￿rm i = 2;:::;nFB. Suppose that the buyer buys





￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ~ u
￿ q
￿1. Obviously, ￿ q ￿ k since buying more than k products implies that
some of them would not be used: then the buyer may reduce her outlay without reducing
her gross payo⁄. Actually, however, ￿ q ￿ k ￿ qFB
1 + qSB
￿1 must hold since pij = c for any
i = 2;:::;n and any j = 1;:::;k and there are only k￿qFB
1 +qSB
￿1 products in the portfolios of
￿rms ￿1 with values not lower than c. But then we can prove that for any ￿ q ￿ k￿qFB
1 +qSB
￿1 ,
the buyer can increase her payo⁄ by buying from 1 the products in BFB
1 . First, consider
the case in which ￿ q ￿ k ￿ qFB
1 . Then, it is obvious that the buyer can increase her payo⁄
by simply buying the products in BFB
1 in addition to buying from ￿rms ￿1 the products
of values ~ u1
￿1;:::; ~ u
￿ q
￿1. Second, consider the case in which k ￿ qFB
1 < ￿ q ￿ k ￿ qFB
1 + qSB
￿1 .
Then, we show below that the buyer can increase her payo⁄by buying the products in BFB
1
37and not buying from ￿rms ￿1 the products with values ~ u
k￿qFB
1 +1
￿1 ;:::; ~ u
￿ q
￿1. This changes the
























￿1 ￿ [~ u
k￿qFB
1 +1
￿1 + ::: + ~ u
￿ q















￿1 + ::: + u
￿ q
￿1 ￿ c(￿ q ￿ k + q
FB
1 )]

























￿1g has cardinality qSB
￿1 ￿(￿ q ￿k +qFB





￿1 ￿ c, ￿￿0 is non-negative.
In this way we have proved that the buyer buys at least one product of ￿rm 1, and then
pays the ￿xed fee F ￿
1. The same argument holds for any other ￿rm i = 2;:::;nFB, and this
reveals that the buyer buys at least all the products in BFB
i , i = 1;:::;nFB. But since she
will not buy more than k products, it must be the case that she buys BFB
1 [:::[BFB
nFB and
buys nothing from ￿rm i = nFB + 1;:::;n.
Step 2 When each ￿rm h 6= i plays tr￿
h, ￿rm i cannot make a pro￿t larger than F ￿
i .
We prove this claim for ￿rm 1, and the same argument applies for i = 2;:::;n. From Lemma
1, it is enough to consider ￿rm 1￿ s deviation in the set of technology-renting strategies TR1.
Obviously, ￿rm 1 has no incentive to decrease F1 below F ￿
1. We now prove that ￿rm 1 has
no incentive to increase F1 above F ￿
1. Note ￿rst that from the fact that F ￿
1 makes the buyer
indi⁄erent between renting 1￿ s technology or not, the buyer can achieve the payo⁄equal to
￿￿
0 without buying any product from ￿rm 1. Suppose now that 1 chooses F1 = F ￿
1 + " for
" > 0. We need to prove that the buyer will not buy any product from 1. The buyer can
make a pro￿t of ￿￿
0 by buying only from ￿rms ￿1, and she cannot make a pro￿t ￿ ￿ ￿￿
0
by buying one or more products from 1 (given F1 = F ￿
1 + "), because if she could then she
would make at least pro￿t ￿ + " > ￿￿
0 before the deviation of 1: a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider a pro￿le of strategies (s1;:::;sn) such that the buyer buys a portfolio of prod-
ucts B = B1 [:::[Bn and, for instance, B1 does not include all the products in BFB
1 ; that
is, BFB
1 nB1 6= ;. Let ￿1 denote the pro￿t of ￿rm 1 and let ￿0 denote the buyer￿ s payo⁄
given these strategies. We prove that there exists a pro￿table deviation for ￿rm 1, and thus





￿1 ;:::; ~ u
￿ q
￿1, it is conceivable that the buyer stops renting the technology of some ￿rms.
38(s1;:::;sn) is not a NE. Consider now the strategy tr1 2 TR1 of ￿rm 1 with F1 = ￿1 +" for
" > 0 and small. We below prove that the buyer buys at least one product from ￿rm 1, and
therefore 1￿ s pro￿t increases to ￿1+". In order to prove this, we ￿rst note that if the buyer
does not buy any product from 1, she cannot make a payo⁄ higher than ￿0 [otherwise she
would not buy B given (s1;:::;sn)]. Then it su¢ ces to show that the buyer can earn more
than ￿0 by purchasing B [ f1jg, with 1j 2 BFB
1 nB1, which includes at least one product
o⁄ered by ￿rm 1. Consider ￿rst the case in which #(B) < k. Then, the buyer￿ s payo⁄from
buying B [f1jg is equal to ￿0 +u
j
1 ￿c￿", which is larger than ￿0 since 1j 2 BFB implies
u
j
1 > c. Consider now the case in which #(B) = k. In this case, the buyer￿ s payo⁄ from




h, where hj0 denotes the lowest valued product in B, which
the buyer removes from one slot to make room for product 1j. We know that u
j
1 ￿ uk since
1j 2 BFB and ￿u
j0




h ￿ uk￿uk+1￿"￿c > 0
holds given that uk ￿ uk+1 > c.
Proof of Proposition 5
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. Consider a pro￿le of strategies
(s1;:::;sn) such that the buyer buys B = B1 [ ::: [ Bn and, for instance, B1 does not
include all the products in BFB
1 ; there exists a product 1j 2 BFB
1 nB1. Let ￿1 denote the
pro￿t of ￿rm 1 given these strategies, while ￿0 represents the buyer￿ s payo⁄. We prove that
there exists a pro￿table deviation for ￿rm 1, and thus (s1;:::;sn) is not a NE. Consider the
strategy of ￿rm 1 in TR1 such that F1 = ￿1 + " (for " > 0 and small). In order to prove
that this is a pro￿table deviation for 1, it su¢ ces to show that the buyer buys at least one
product from ￿rm 1, as this yields 1 a pro￿t of ￿1 + " which is larger than ￿1. Note ￿rst
that in the case in which the buyer does not buy any product from 1, she can make at
most a pro￿t equal to ￿0. Consider ￿rst the case in which #(B) < k. Then, the buyer
can buy B [ f1jg and gets a payo⁄ equal to ￿0 + u
j
1 ￿ c ￿ ", which is larger than ￿0 since
1j 2 BFB implies u
j
1 > c. Consider now the case of #(B) = k. Then the buyer can buy
B [ f1jg=fhj0g where hj0 denotes the lowest valued product in B: the buyer replaces hj0









h > 0 since Ph(Bh)￿Ph(Bhnfhj0g) ￿ c by (2). Thus,
after 1￿ s deviation, the buyer will buy at least one product of 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) If su¢ ces to prove that if ￿rm i plays tr￿
i, then the buyer buys at least one product
of ￿rm i whatever are the strategies played by the other ￿rms; this implies ￿i = F ￿
i , and
39thus F ￿
i is a lower bound for the pro￿t that seller i can realize. Indeed, even in the case
in which the buyer has already bought all the products in B￿i, she is willing to pay F ￿
i to
substitute the products in BSB
￿i with the products in BFB




(ii) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a NE such that 1 makes a pro￿t





￿1 ). Precisely, suppose that 1 sells a bundle
B1 ￿ B1 such that q1 = #B1, and 2 sells a bundle B2 ￿ B2 such that q2 = #B2. Then 1￿ s
revenue P1(B1) is larger than F ￿












2 ￿ P1(B1) ￿ ￿ P2













1 + cq1) ￿ ￿ P2
since P1(B1) > F ￿
1 + cq1. We prove that the latter inequality implies the existence of a
pro￿table deviation for ￿rm 2.
Let 2 deviate by using a technology renting strategy with F2 = ￿ P2 ￿ cq2 + ", with " > 0
and small. Since in the candidate NE considered in the beginning the pro￿t of 2 is equal
to ￿ P2￿cq2, this deviation of 2 is pro￿table if and only if the buyer buys at least one object
from 2. In order to prove that this is the case, we notice that if the buyer does not buy
anything from ￿rm 2, then she buys only bundles o⁄ered by 1, and they cannot yield the
buyer a payo⁄ larger than ￿, otherwise we obtain a contradiction with the fact that the
initial candidate is a NE. Let ~ B2 = BFB
2 [ BSB
￿1 denote the bundle of 2 which includes his
best k2 = qFB
2 + qSB
￿1 products. We show below that the buyer￿ s pro￿t if she buys only ~ B2
is larger than ￿, and thus we infer that she will de￿nitely buy at least one product from
￿rm 2.





￿1 ￿ ￿ P2 ￿ c(k2 ￿ q2)
and we below prove ￿ ￿ ￿; then, since ￿ > ￿, we obtain ￿ > ￿ for the case in which " = 0,











































































(iii) Here we prove that when ￿rms are required to satisfy (2), in any NE the pro￿t of
￿rm i is at least F ￿
i . This result holds for any n ￿ 2, but in the case of n = 2 [jointly with
(ii)] it implies the statement in Proposition 6(iii).32
This claim is obvious for i = nFB + 1;:::;n, asF ￿
i = 0 for these ￿rms. About ￿rm i =
1;:::;nFB, we show that if ￿rm i plays (1), then (regardless of the strategies followed by
the other ￿rms), the buyer buys BFB
i ; hence, ￿rm i can get a pro￿t equal to F ￿
i ; this
establishes that his equilibrium pro￿t is not lower than F ￿
i . The proof is by contradiction,
is written for ￿rm 1, and follows closely the proof of Step 1 in the proof of Proposition
3. Suppose that 1 plays tr￿
1 and the buyer buys nothing from ￿rm 1, while she buys ￿ q
products from ￿rms ￿1, with values ~ u1
￿1;:::; ~ u
￿ q
￿1 such that ~ u1
￿1 ￿ ::: ￿ ~ u
￿ q
￿1. Obviously,
￿ q ￿ k￿qFB
1 +qSB
￿1 because of (2) and because the best alternative portfolio without buying
any product from 1 cannot include more than k ￿ qFB
1 + qSB
￿1 products from the de￿nition
of qFB
1 and qSB
￿1 . But then the buyer can increase her payo⁄by buying from 1 the products
in BFB
1 . To prove this, consider ￿rst the case of ￿ q ￿ k ￿ qFB
1 . Then, it is obvious that
the buyer can increase her payo⁄ by simply buying the products in BFB
1 in addition to
buying from ￿rms ￿1 the products with values ~ u1
￿1;:::; ~ u
￿ q
￿1. Second, consider the case in
which k ￿qFB
1 < ￿ q ￿ k ￿qFB
1 +qSB
￿1 . Then, we show below that the buyer can increase her
payo⁄ by buying the products in BFB




￿1 ;:::; ~ u
￿ q



















￿1 ;:::; ~ u
￿ q
￿1. Because of (2), E is not smaller than c(￿ q ￿ k + qFB
















Then we can argue like in the proof of Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 1 to prove that
the latter term is non-negative.
Proof of Proposition 8
32In particular, the proof of Proposition 6(ii) applies verbatim also to the setting in which ￿rms must
satisfy (2), since the deviation which is proposed for ￿rm 2 uses a technology renting strategy.
41We take care of only part (ii) when qFB
i ￿ 1 and qFB
h ￿ 1 since the proof of part (i) is
given just after the statement.




























































We prove that (3) holds with equality if maxfu
k￿qFB
i +1
￿i ￿ c;0g = maxfu
k￿qFB
h +1
￿h ￿ c;0g =
maxfuk
￿(i+h) ￿ c;0g and with strict inequality otherwise.











￿h ￿ c;0g = 0, otherwise it holds with strict inequality.
Proof. From the de￿nition of qSB










































￿h ￿ c;0g = maxfuk
￿(i+h) ￿ c;0g.








￿i ￿ c) + ::: + (uk
￿i ￿ c) + (u
k￿qFB
h +1




























for j = 1;:::;qFB
h , we infer that the equality holds in (4) if and only if u
k￿qFB
i +j

















￿(i+h) ￿ c;0g for j = 1;:::;qFB
h . This occurs if and only if u
k￿qFB
i +1




￿h ￿ c = maxfuk







￿h ￿ c;0g = maxfuk
￿(i+h) ￿ c;0g since qSB
￿i ￿ 1 and qSB




￿i ￿ c = maxfu
k￿qFB
i +1
￿i ￿ c;0g and u
k￿qFB
h +1




Proof of Proposition 9





￿1 . Recall that u
k+1
￿2 is the value of the (k + 1)-th best product in B￿2, and
consider the set ~ B￿2 ￿ B￿2nBFB
￿2 . Since BFB




value of the (qFB
2 +1)-th best product in ~ B￿2. By de￿nition, ~ B￿2 includes all non-￿rst-best




1 and the non-￿rst-best
products of ￿rms 3;:::;n ￿let ~ B￿(1+2) ￿ ~ B￿2nB1 denote the set of the latter products.
Likewise, u
k+1
￿1 is the value of the (qFB
1 + 1)-th best product in ~ B￿1 ￿ B￿1nBFB
￿1 , which










2 and by the products in















that maximize the value of u
k+1
￿1 under the assumption that the portfolio of ￿rm 1 dominates






2 should be the largest possible, and













￿1 , as (i) u
k+1
￿2 is the value of the (qFB
2 +1)-th best product in ~ B￿2, and u
k+1
￿1
is the value of the (qFB
1 + 1)-th best product in ~ B￿1; (ii) ~ B￿1 includes the same products
as ~ B￿2, in addition to the qFB
1 ￿ qFB









2 is just the di⁄erence between qFB
1 + 1 and qFB
2 + 1.33
33Although we implicitly assume that qFB
1 > qFB
2 , the proof goes through even when qFB
1 = qFB
2 , as then










2. In this case ~ B￿1 and ~ B￿2 include
products with exactly the same values, and thus qFB
1 = qFB
2 implies u
k+1
￿2 = u
k+1
￿1 .
43